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Kevin Mulligan defends the view that there are relations but that all rela-
tions are internal relations.  There are, according to him, no external rela-
tions, but only internal relations.  He argues that true predications of ex-
ternal relations between things are made true by internal relations be-
tween tropes of these things.  I think that he is right in claiming that one 
can do without external relations.  Can one perhaps even do without any 
relations at all – even without internal relations?  In what follows I shall 
first give further support to the thesis that there are no external relations 
by discussing the case of comparative statements.  Then, I shall try to 
make sense of the notion of an internal relation and I shall suggest that 
internal relations are not really something over and above the terms of 
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the relation. 
 
The defender of external relations claims that a statement like 'This stone 
a is heavier than that stone b' is made true by an entity which is best de-
scribed as a's being heavier than b.  The external relation between a and b 
is supposed to be an entity which is borne by a as well as by b.  According 
to this view, we get the following picture of our case with the two stones 
one of which is heavier than the other:  There are these two things, stone 
a and stone b.  Stone a has mass-trope α and stone b has mass-trope β.  
According to the view that is criticised by Kevin Mulligan there is addi-
tionally a relational trope ρ(a,b), which is borne by the things a and b.  
This relational trope is considered to be the truthmaker of 'This stone a is 
heavier than that stone b'.  To support Kevin Mulligan's claim that this 
approach is wrong I shall point out two weaknesses of this view. 
First, we may be suspicious about entities which are borne by more than 
one thing.  Is it the set, or the group, or the sum of the related things of 
which the relation is an accident?  Or is each of the related things in the 
full sense bearer of the relation?  I think that there is a vague intuition 
which leads to suspicion about relations, and I shall try to spell it out 
more clearly.  For this I introduce a certain notion of ontological depend-
ence which includes both rigid and generic dependence:  Let us say that 
an entity x depends on an entity y if x cannot exist except by coexisting 
with y in a single whole or coexisting with another entity, which is a 
member of a certain class of entities which includes y. (Cf. Roman Ingar-
den, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt I, § 14) I consider (monadic) a 
trope to be dependent in this sense upon the thing of which it is a trope 
(that is, according to an ontology without substrata, it is dependent on the 
other tropes of the thing).  That means that I believe that there cannot be 
free-floating single tropes, such as a single mass trope which does not co-
exist with certain other tropes (a density, a charge etc.).  Furthermore, I 
think there are good reasons to believe that a thing is dependent on each 
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of its tropes, that is, no trope can be removed from a thing if it is not re-
placed by another trope of an appropriate kind.  The mass-trope of a cer-
tain stone, for instance, can only be removed from the stone if it is re-
placed by another mass trope.  Every trope of a thing is needed by the 
thing.  This is the reason why one does not need any binding entities or 
any glue to hold the tropes of a thing together.  The tropes of a thing exist 
together because they are mutually dependent on each other.  However, 
relational tropes would not behave like that.  The problem with them is 
not mainly that they depend on more than one thing, but rather that the 
things which are related by them depend in no way on them.  In this 
sense relational tropes are not required by anything.  Therefore, it seems 
advisable to try to do without relational tropes.   
Moreover, secondly, the view that 'This stone a is heavier than that stone 
b' is made true by the relational entity ρ(a,b) leaves it totally obscure what 
ρ(a,b) has to do with the masses of a and b.  If a's being heavier than b 
consists in a's and b's bearing together the entity ρ(a,b) then the mass-
tropes α and β seem to contribute nothing to the truth of 'This stone a is 
heavier than that stone b'.  But we would like to say that a is heavier than 
b because a has mass α and b has mass β.  However, it will be difficult 
construe a connection between α and β and ρ(a,b) if one assumes – as the 
defender of external relations does – that they are distinct entities.  There-
fore, I think, Kevin Mulligan is right in claiming that there are no external 
relations.  I assume that relations between things always obtain because 
the things in question have certain (monadic) properties.  But how is it to 
be explained that a relation obtains because the related things have cer-
tain properties?  Kevin Mulligan suggests that a relation between things – 
i.e. an external relation – obtains because a certain internal relation be-
tween properties of these things obtains.  'This stone a is heavier than that 
stone b' is made true by an internal relation between the mass tropes α 
and β.   
 3 
Which internal relation between a and b is it that makes the sentence 
true?  Kevin Mulligan suggests that it is the relation of being greater than 
holding between α and β.  'This stone a is heavier than that stone b' is 
made true by the internal relation of being greater than holding between 
the mass-trope α and the mass-trope β and the fact that a has α and b has 
β.  Mulligan argues that the relation of being heavier than holding be-
tween the two stones can be constructed out of the relation of being 
greater than and the two mass-tropes of the stones.   
However, we still don't seem to have reached the ontological bedrock yet.  
The basic relation holding between tropes is the (internal) relation of re-
semblance, and I suggest that the relation of being greater than holding 
between tropes can be constructed out of the resemblances between the 
tropes.  The mass-trope of stone a resembles the mass-trope of stone b to 
a certain degree.  Let us assume that a has a mass of 4 kilograms and b has 
a mass of 3 kilograms.  The 4-kilogram-trope resembles any 3-kilogram-
trope to a higher degree than it resembles any 2-kilogram-trope.  Any 2-
kilogram-trope resembles the 3-kilogram-trope to a higher degree than it 
resembles the 4-kilogram-trope.  These resemblances amongst the mass-
tropes are the basis of the order of masses.  Every mass-trope resembles 
every other mass-trope to a certain degree so that the mass-tropes form a 
spectrum.  The mass-trope of a 'is greater than' the mass-trope of b be-
cause of their relative positions on the resemblance-spectrum of masses.  
The relation of being greater than between the mass-trope of a and the 
mass-trope of b obtains because these tropes are such that they resemble 
certain other mass-tropes to a certain degree.   
Is resemblance between tropes an internal relation?  A relation between x 
and y is an internal relation just if the relation must obtain if x and y exist.  
Internal relations are relations whose obtaining depends wholly on the 
nature of the related entities; they supervene on the terms of the relation.  
External relations, on the other hand, are relations into which entities can 
enter and which can cease to obtain whilst the related entities continue to 
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exist.  Accordingly, resemblance between tropes is an internal relation, 
because it is impossible that the tropes should exist without the resem-
blance obtaining between them.  The resemblance between tropes wholly 
depends on how and what the tropes are.  It is not a relation into which 
the tropes could enter or which could cease to exist while the tropes still 
exist. 
The question I want to address finally is whether internal relations be-
tween tropes are 'irreducibly relational entities', as Kevin Mulligan claims.  
I shall mention two reasons why one may be suspicious about the exis-
tence of such relational entities.  First, it is difficult to see how these rela-
tional tropes would fit into a trope ontology as it is defended by Kevin 
Mulligan.  According to trope ontology things are complexes of tropes.  
But what sense can be made of the claim that there are tropes which relate 
tropes?  How should these relational tropes be linked to the tropes they 
relate?  The only linkage I can think of between a trope and the entity of 
which it is a trope is mutual dependence.  It is by mutual dependence, I 
think, that tropes are linked with the things of which they are tropes.  
(Where in most cases a trope is considered to be rigidly dependent on the 
thing, whilst the thing is generically dependent on the trope.)  I have al-
ready pointed out above that no account of the linkage between relational 
tropes that relate things and the things in question is available.  Tropes 
that relate tropes face the same problem.  If α is a trope of a thing a, and β 
is a trope of a thing b, and ρ is a trope which relates α and β, ρ would be 
dependent on α and β.  It could not exist if α or β did not exist.  But nei-
ther α nor β would be dependent on ρ, because α could exist without ρ (if 
β did not exist) and β could exist without ρ (if α did not exist).  And nei-
ther a nor b would be dependent on ρ.  So what should hold ρ and α and 
β together?   
Secondly, the fact that internal relations are such that they have to obtain 
if the related terms exist can be explained by the fact that they are 'not on-
tologically additional to their terms', as Armstrong (1997, A World of 
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States of Affairs, p. 12) puts it.  It is just the mass of this stone and the 
mass of that stone which make it that one of the stones is heavier than the 
other.  It is just because these two mass-tropes are what and how they are 
that one of them 'is greater than' the other.  There is no need to assume – 
and indeed this assumption would have no explanatory power – that 
there is an additional entity, an irreducible dyadic trope, which relates the 
two tropes.  The statement 'This stone a is heavier than that stone b' is 
made true by an internal relation between the mass-trope of a and the 
mass-trope of b.  For this statement to be true it is enough that the two 
stones have the masses they have.  As far as I can see we have no reason so 
far to accept that there are irreducible polyadic properties. 
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